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EXPANSION OF THE (F) REORGANIZATION
by
Edward C. Osterberg, Jr.*
p ART III of subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 sets forth
the rules governing the tax treatment of a variety of corporate readjust-
ments referred to generically as "reorganizations."' If a corporate readjustment
can be fitted into one of the tax definitions of a reorganization, the general
scheme of Part III is to defer recognition of gain or loss on the transaction,
on the theory that the transaction is not sufficiently "closed" to require the im-
position of an immediate tax. This general scheme is carried out by providing
for nonrecognition of gain or loss and carryover of basise where a shareholder
exchanges stock of a corporation that is a party to the reorganization.4
I. DEFINITION AND EARLY APPLICATION
Subsection (F) of section 368(a) (1) defines a reorganization as "a mere
change in identity, form, or place of organization, however effected." The gen-
esis of this definition can be found in section 202 (c) (2) of the Revenue Act
of 1921,' which defined a reorganization to include "a mere change in identity,
form, or place of organization of a corporation (however effected)." In 1924,
the words "of a corporation" were deleted,' but the legislative history indicates
that the deletion was not intended to have any operative effect." Although in
1954 the House of Representatives proposed repeal of what is now the (F)
reorganization since it was so little used by taxpayers,8 it was retained in the
1954 Code,' and its previous lack of judicial interpretation has been more
than compensated for in recent decisions.
* B.A., J.D., Northwestern University. Attorney at Law, Houston, Texas. This Article
is a condensation of a thesis submitted in partial satisfaction of requirements for the degree
of LL.M. in Taxation at Southern Methodist University School of Law.
'INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 368(a).21d. S 354. Often business exigencies dictate that the exchange involve the receipt of
cash or other property in addition to stock or securities. If the reorganization exchange would
be tax-free except for the fact that the exchanging shareholder receives not only stock but
also money or other property (so-called "boot"), or receives securities the principal amount
of which exceeds the principal amount of the securities surrendered, the gain, if any (but
not the loss), is recognized. The recognition is limited to "an amount not in excess of the
money and the fair market value of the other property" received in the exchange. Id. § 356.
(The corresponding provision for boot received by a corporation in the exchange is id.§ 361 (b).) Thus, the boot received in a reorganization exchange is taxed only to the extent
that gain is realized; this gain may be taxable as ordinary income to the extent of the
shareholder's pro rata share of the distributing corporation's earnings and profits. See
Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. 283 (1945). That part of the gain recog-
nized may be taxed as ordinary income, rather than as capital gain, if the exchange "has
the effect of the distribution of a dividend." INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 356(a) (2).
3INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 358.
' Similar provisions accord nonrecognition of gain or loss and carryover of basis to a
corporation which is a party to the reorganization. Id. §§ 358, 361. In the case of the
corporation exchanging its stock for property in the reorganization, the corporation's basis
in the property is the same as the transferor's basis, id. § 362(b), and the corporation
would not recognize gain or loss by virtue of id. § 1032, which provides for nonrecognition
of gain or loss on the receipt by the corporation of money or other property in exchange
for its stock.
' Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(c) (2), 42 Stat. 230.6 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, 5 203(h) (1) (D), 43 Stat. 257.7 H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1924).8See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1954).
9See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 273 (1954).
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The Supreme Court first considered the (F) reorganization in Helvering
v. Southwest Consolidated Corp."0 The case involved a bankruptcy reorganiza-
tion in which the assets of the old corporation were transferred to a new
corporation and, under the creditors' plan of reorganization, the creditors of the
old corporation emerged as controlling shareholders of the new corporation.
The Supreme Court held that the transaction could not be regarded as a mere
change of identity, form, or place of organization because of the substantial
shift of the proprietary interest in the corporation due to the creditors of the
old corporation becoming controlling shareholders of the new corporation.
The Court stated: "[A] transaction which shifts the ownership of the pro-
prietary interest in a corporation is hardly 'a mere change in identity, form, or
place of organization' within the meaning of clause [F].""
Following the Supreme Court's enunciation of the lack of a shift in proprie-
tary interest as the touchstone of the (F) reorganization, early applications of
the (F) definition were limited to a narrow approach involving unambiguous
transactions. Thus, a change in the state of incorporation, such as by merger
into a wholly owned subsidiary newly organized in another state," or the con-
version of a federal savings and loan association into a state building and loan
association," was held to constitute an (F) reorganization. However, in Rev-
enue Ruling 66-284" the Internal Revenue Service created a de minimis
exception to the lack of a shift in proprietary interest where, in order to change
the state of incorporation, the old corporation organized a subsidiary in another
state and then merged into the new corporation. This plan was allowed even
though approximately one percent of the shareholders of the old corporation
dissented to the plan of reincorporation and received cash for their shares in the
old corporation.
II. LIQUIDATION-REINCORPORATION
The most noteworthy developments in the (F) reorganization area have
occurred where taxpayers have structured the transaction to gain some tax
advantage by falling within one of the tax-free reorganization patterns, or
conversely, where they have structured the underlying transactions to obtain
other tax advantages by avoiding classification as a reorganization. The struc-
tures these transactions have taken have in turn produced "remarkable in-
genuity"'" on the part of the courts in finding reorganizations even where the
transactions do not literally conform to the reorganization definition, or in
refusing to hold that the transactions constitute a reorganization even though
the facts literally fall within the definition of a reorganization.
10315 U.S. 194 (1942).
"Id. at 202-03. It is interesting that the Supreme Court refused to treat the creditors
of the old corporation as owners of the equity interest even though, by the time of the
bankruptcy proceeding, the creditors were empowered to supplant the stockholders. Cf.
Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179 (1942).
1 Newmarket Mfg. Co. v. United States, 233 F.2d 493 (1st Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353
U.S. 983 (1957); Rev. Rul. 64-250, 1964-2 CUM. BULL. 333.
13 Rev. Rul. 54-193, 1954-1 CUM. BULL. 106.
14 1966-2 CUM. BULL. 115.
"See Hjorth, Liquidation and Reincorporations-Before and After Davant, 42 U.
WASH. L. REV. 737, 739 (1967).
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The area in which the (F) reorganization has recently received considerable
attention involves the so-called liquidation-reincorporation problem. Basically,
a liquidation-reincorporation involves the liquidation of an existing corporation
followed by a transfer of part or all of its operating assets to another corpora-
tion, often newly organized, which is generally owned by the same shareholders
as the old corporation. If such a transaction is accepted for what it purports
to be, the shareholders would generally recognize long-term gain on the liqui-
dation."8 The basis of the property received by the shareholders would be its
fair market value on the date of the liquidation-distribution," and the transfer
of assets to the new corporation would be tax-free." The new corporation's
basis in the property would be its fair market value on the date of the liquida-
tion-distribution of the old corporation, 9 thus giving the new corporation an
increased basis in the operating assets for larger depreciation deductions. The
old corporation would ordinarily recognize no income on the liquidation-
distribution"0 except for the recapture of depreciation." Finally, the new corpo-
ration would commence operations with a zero balance in its earnings and
profits account."
Classification as a (D) Reorganization. Until recently, the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue was successful in his attempts to categorize the liquidation-
reincorporation transaction as a (D) reorganization," thus opening the way
to taxation of the property taken out of corporate dissolution as a distribution of
"boot," as well as preventing a step-up in basis in the operating assets. Because
of the requirements necessary to effect a (D) reorganization," the net effect
is to define a (D) reorganization as either: (1) The transfer to a controlled
corporation of substantially all the assets of the transferor corporation, followed
by the distribution of all the transferor's assets (including the stock, securities
and other property received by the transferor in connection with the transfer)
to the transferor's shareholders;" or (2) The transfer to each controlled
', INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 331.I7d. 334 (a).
'
8 Id. § 351.
"Id. § 362(a).
20 Id. § 336.
21Id. § 1245, 1250.
"A good discussion of the multifarious forms the basic liquidation-reincorporation can
take can be found in Hjorth, supra note 15, at 740-44. See also Lane, The Reincorporation
Game: Have the Ground Rules Really Changed?, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1218 (1964); Mac-
Lean, Problems of Reincorporation and Related Proposals of the Subchapter C Advisory,
13 TAx L. REV. 407 (1958); Rice, When Is a Liquidation Not a Liquidation for Federal
Income Tax Purposes?, 8 STAN. L. REV. 208, 219-22 (1956).
2" INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 368(a) (1) (D).
4 To fall within the definition of a (D) reorganization, a transaction must meet two
requirements: (a) there must be a transfer by one corporation of some or all of its assets
to another corporation, eighty per cent of the stock of which, immediately after the trans-
fer, is owned by the transferor corporation, one or more of its shareholders, or any com-
bination thereof; and (b) as part of the plan of reorganization, stock or securities of the
transferee corporation are distributed in a transaction which qualifies under §§ 354, 355
or 356. Id.
2Id. S 354(b). While not an integral part of this definition of a (D) reorganization,
the requirements that the transferee corporation acquire substantially all the assets of the
transferor and that the transferor distribute all its properties as a practical matter will result




transferee corporation of a separate active business conducted for at least five
years prior to the distribution by the transferor corporation, and after the trans-
fer of the separate business, the transferor corporation must either (a) have no
assets other than stock or securities of the transferee corporation, or (b) carry
on a separate business conducted for at least five years.'"
The (D) reorganization as defined in (2) above has had little utility in
attacking a liquidation-reincorporation. The transferor corporation, by retain-
ing only the liquid assets as an inherent part of the reincorporation scheme,
would have assets other than the stock or securities of the transferee corpora-
tion and generally would not be engaged in a separate business after the
transfer. Furthermore, by its terms, the devisive reorganization is not appli-
cable where the transaction is used "principally as a device for the distribution
of earnings and profits.""7 Therefore, until recently the Commissioner's success
in attacking the liquidation-reincorporation transaction as a reorganization has
come when the transaction has been categorized as a (D) reorganization in
which a transfer of substantially all the assets of the transferor corporation to
a controlled corporation is followed by a complete liquidation of the transferor
corporation.
The reorganization provisions were designed primarily to prevent taxation
in certain corporate adjustments where the corporate continuity was left undis-
turbed in substance. Use of these provisions in attacking liquidation-reincorpo-
rations to prevent tax avoidance has required judicial stretching of the interpre-
tation of the reorganization sections, particularly the (D) definition. 8 Yet
despite the judicial stretching of the (D) reorganization definition to fit a
typical liquidation-reincorporation transaction, the possibility remained that
taxpayers could be successful in having their transactions treated as true liquida-
tions, with the attendant tax benefits outlined above. When the facts demon-
strate a sufficiently long hiatus in the business operations, the courts have held
that there is no reincorporation.2"
26 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 355. This is the spin-off, split-up, or split-off type of
divisive reorganization.
17 1d. § 355(a) (1) (B).
28 For example, the judicial stretching has included the following deviations from the
normal definition of the (D) reorganization: (1) The requirement that a transfer of sub-
stantially all the working assets of the old corporation be made has been interpreted as being
met if all such assets remaining in a corporation after a preliminary distribution of assets
are transferred. Ralph C. Wilson, Jr., 46 T.C. 334 (1966). Support for this decision is
found in Helvering v. Elkhorn Coal Co., 95 F.2d 732 (4th Cit. 1937), cert. denied, 305
U.S. 605 (1938), and Commissioner v. Mellon, 184 F.2d 157 (3d Cit. 1950), af]'g 12
T.C. 90 (1949). (2) Similarly, though an exchange of stock of the transferor corporation
for that of the transferee corporation must occur, this requirement has been disregarded.
For instance, if the shareholders of the transferor corporation create the transferee corpora-
tion by paying for its stock, and the cash is used by the transferee corporation to purchase
the operating assets of the transferor corporation, and the transferor corporation then
distributes its retained liquid assets to its shareholders in complete liquidation, the original
cash contribution has been disregarded and the steps taken have been viewed as the sur-
render of shares of the transferor corporation and the receipt of shares of the transferee
corporation. See Liddon v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 304 (6th Cit. 1956), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 824 (1957); Keller v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 376 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
325 U.S. 868 (1945); David T. Grubbs, 39 T.C. 42 (1962). The requirement of an ex-
change of stock is also disregarded where the transfer of assets is between two pre-existing
corporations, both owned by the same shareholders in the same proportions. Commissioner
v. Morgan, 288 F.2d 676 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 836 (1961).
29See Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965), rev'g in part
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A substantial shift in proprietary interest has probably been the most signifi-
cant fact in avoiding reorganization classification. In Joseph C. Gallagher"0 the
court refused to require treatment as a (D) reorganization where seventy-
three percent of the stock of the transferee corporation was owned by share-
holders of the transferor corporation. In Berghash v. Commissioner" the court
also found a complete liquidation, not a reincorporation, where fifty percent of
the stock of the transferee corporation was owned by an employee who was not
a shareholder of the transferor corporation. A proprietary shift has also been
sufficient to avoid (D) reorganization status, even though the transferee corpo-
ration was itself owned by a third corporation controlled by the same share-
holders as the transferor corporation. The court refused to apply the attribution
rules to treat the individual shareholders of the third corporation as sharehold-
ers of the transferee corporation."8
Classification as an (F) Reorganization. Because of the somewhat limited
utility of the (D) definition in controlling tax avoidance in liquidation-rein-
corporations, the courts and the Commissioner, early in the 1960's, began to
attack the problem by use of the (F) reorganization. Traditionally, the (F)
reorganization had been seen as applicable only to the most formal and insub-
stantial corporate readjustments. Its utility in the liquidation-reincorporation
area is discussed below.
1. Functionally Unrelated Shifts in Ownership. In using the (F) reorganiza-
tion to attack the liquidation-reincorporation transactions, the Commissioner
has attempted, as with the (D) reorganization, to stretch the (F) definition.
Since an (F) reorganization is defined as "a mere change in identity, form, or
place of organization,"' a shift in ownership interests of the corporation would
appear to take a transaction out of the definition. The Commissioner has at-
tempted to keep such transactions within the (F) definition by finding shifts
in ownership "functionally unrelated" to the reorganization. In the following
discussion of this problem it will be helpful to separate the case law and the
position of the Internal Revenue Service as expressed in its rulings.
(a) The Courts. The first attempt to stretch the (F) reorganization to fit a
liquidation-reincorporation transaction occurred in Pridemark, Inc." The Tax
Court held that where the transferor corporation was liquidated, but a year later
its business was resumed by a successor corporation which had acquired its
assets from the shareholders common to both corporations, an (F) reorganiza-
tion had occurred.' However, Pridemark was reversed on appeal.' In finding
42 T.C. 510 (1964); Sharp v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 884 (S.D. Tex. 1966).
3039 T.C. 144 (1962).
31361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1966).
3Breech v. United States, 439 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1971). The Government's attempt
to find the requisite control by reading the "any combination thereof" language in INT. REV.
CODE of 1954, § 368 (a) (1) (D) as encompassing the individual shareholders of the third
corporation which was in control of the transferee corporation was also rejected.3 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 368(a) (1) (F).
42 T.C. 510 (1964).
It is interesting that the Commissioner did not attack these transactions as a (D)
reorganization. Since the transferor's shareholders as a group emerged in control of the
transferee corporation, the transactions would appear to fit the (D) definition.
36345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965).
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that a true liquidation had occurred, the Fourth Circuit emphasized the year-
long hiatus in business activity. The court viewed the (F) definition as limited
to cases where the corporate enterprise continues uninterrupted, except perhaps
for a distribution of some of its liquid assets.37
Soon after Pridemark the Commissioner was successful (on appeal) in Reef
Corporation38 in applying the (F) definition to prevent the transferee corpora-
tion from taking a stepped-up basis in the transferred assets. The transferor
corporation was a Texas corporation owned by two groups of shareholders. One
group (the active group) wanted to buy out the second group, which was not
taking an active part in the management of the business. Accordingly, the ac-
tive group formed a new corporation under Delaware law, and the transferor
corporation contracted to sell its assets to the new corporation for the new
corporation's notes. To carry out the transactions, all of the stock of the trans-
feror corporation was sold to a third party, who in turn was to execute the sale
of the transferor's assets to the new corporation. The transferor corporation
liquidated, but the business which had been operated by it continued to be
operated without interruption by the new corporation. At issue was whether
this was a sale and not a reorganization such that the new corporation could
claim a stepped-up basis in the assets of the transferor corporation. The Tax
Court disregarded the role of the third party as a mere straw-man conduit, but
held that an (F) reorganization could not have taken place because of the
change that occurred in the proprietary interests, in other words, the elimination
of the inactive shareholders was more than a mere change in identity, form, or
place of organization. The court felt that the shift in proprietary interest was
an inherent part of the over-all plan to eliminate the passive group of share-
holders from an equity participation in the business. However, the Tax Court
did find that these transactions amounted to a (D) reorganization.
On appeal,8 the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's holding that a (D)
reorganization had occurred. The Commissioner contended on cross appeal that
the transactions also constituted an (F) reorganization." The Tax Court had
followed the rationale of Helvering v. Southwest Consolidated Corp.4 in find-
ing that the (F) type is inapplicable when there is a substantial shift in the
shareholders' proprietary interest in the corporation. The Fifth Circuit, however,
was able to find an (F) reorganization by separating the transactions into two
" The court cited Rev. Rul. 57-276, 1957-1 CuM. BULL. 126, where merger into a new
corporation organized under a different state's laws was held to constitute an (F) reorgani-
zation. 345 F.2d at 42 n.8. The court noted a proprietary shift, pointing to the fact that
the majority shareholders of eighty percent of the transferor corporation's common stock
received but sixty-one percent of the stock in the transferee corporation plus stock options
which, if exercised, would have reduced their holdings to forty-four percent. However, this
shift in ownership did not form a basis for the court's holding.
3024 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 379 (1965).
SReef Corp. v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cit. 1966), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
1018 (1967).
4' Apparently this contention was made to increase the amount of tax owing, since in an
(F) reorganization the transferor corporation cannot end its taxable year as of the date
of the reorganization. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 381(b) (1). Where a transaction quali-
fies as both an (F) and a (D) reorganization, the more stringent rules relating to account-
ing methods for (F) reorganizations are to be applied. Reef Corp. v. Commissioner, 368
F.2d 125, 136 (5th Cit. 1966), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 1018 (1967).
41315 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1942).
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distinct and unrelated events: first, the holders of forty-eight percent of the
stock of the transferor corporation (the passive group) had their stockholdings
completely redeemed; secondly, the new corporation was formed and the assets
of the transferor corporation were transferred to the new corporation, which
was then owned entirely by the active shareholders of the transferor. The court
felt that confusion flowed from the simultaneous reorganization and stock re-
demption, but held that these two events were functionally unrelated since the
transferor corporation could have completely redeemed the stock of the passive
group without changing its state of incorporation, and since redemption is not
a characteristic of a reorganization.
Reef stands for the proposition that, while as a general rule if a substantial
change in ownership takes place, the transaction cannot be an (F) reorganiza-
tion, a substantial shift in proprietary interests which is contemporaneous with,
but functionally unrelated to, the transaction can be ignored. The result ap-
pears to be that all (D) reorganizations are also (F) reorganizations, where
a single new corporation emerges from a single old corporation, no new share-
holders are injected into the new corporation, and a majority of the sharehold-
ers continue their equity participation in the new corporation."
The question becomes: Under what circumstances can a substantial pro-
prietary shift be ignored as functionally unrelated in finding an (F) reorgani-
zation? If the substantial proprietary shift is considered an integral part of the
reorganization, it should be sufficient to avoid classification as an (F) as well as
a (D) reorganization." It is interesting to note that in the early case of
Cushman Motor Works v. Commissioner' a change in stock ownership result-
ing from the redemption of less than twenty percent of the stock of the old
corporation was held to be so substantial as to disqualify the transaction from
tax-free treatment as an (F) reorganization. This case would appear to be of
little, if any, vitality in view of the Reef rationale that the retirement of some
of the old shareholders can be ignored as a separate and functionally unrelated
redemption. However, even the Reef court thought that if less than fifty per-
cent of the shareholders continued their equity participation in the new corpo-
ration, the transaction would begin to look more like a sale of assets to the
new corporation than a reorganization.'
Whether the injection of shareholders in the new corporation, who were not
41A similar approach was adopted in Babcock v. Phillips, 372 F.2d 240, 244 (10th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 918 (1968), where the court spoke of the new cor-
poration as the "reincarnation" of the old corporation. But the court, in fact, went on to
find a (D) reorganization, since at issue was the taxation of boot to the shareholders, and
a finding of an (F) reorganization was unnecessary.
4 Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194, 203 (1942); Commissioner v.
Berghash, 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. American Institute of Marketing
Sys., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 610 (E.D. Mo. 1972); Estate of Henry P. Lammerts, 54 T.C. 420
(1970), remanded on another issue, 456 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1972); Joseph C. Gallagher,
39 T.C. 144 (1962). It is arguable, however, that it is conceptually easier to view a shift
in proprietary interest among shareholders as functionally unrelated to an (F) reorganization
than to a (D) reorganization, since the (D) reorganization by definition clearly anticipates
that some of the shareholders of the old corporation may drop out of an equity participation
in the new corporation in the parenthetical clause in INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §
368 (a) (1) (D). This may account for the willingness to find an (F) reorganization with
a functionally unrelated redemption as well as a (D) reorganization.
4130 F.2d 977 (8th Cit. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 756 (1943).45 See LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1940).
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also shareholders of the old corporation, may also be disregarded as function-
ally unrelated to a reorganization, so that no proprietary shift occurs as part of
the reorganization, was considered in Dunlap & Associates, Inc.' Here, the old
corporation owned less than eighty percent of the stock of three subsidiaries,
but desired to acquire complete ownership of them. Accordingly, it organized
a new corporation in a different state, the stock of which was exchanged for
stock in the old parent corporation. Three weeks later, the new parent corpora-
tion made an exchange offer which the minority stockholders of the three
subsidiaries accepted, and exchanged their stock for stock in the new parent
corporation. Thus, at the end of the transactions, the shareholders of the old
parent corporation did not emerge as the sole shareholders of the new parent
corporation. The Commissioner contended that an (F) reorganization had
taken place, and, therefore, the old parent corporation was not entitled to close
its tax year under section 381. The taxpayer sought to avoid an (F) reorgani-
zation by contending that all the transactions were designed to further the
common purpose of preparing a public offering of stock of the new parent
corporation, and that the subsequent exchange offer was an integral part of
the transaction, which resulted in a substantial proprietary shift because of
the injection of new shareholders. However, the Tax Court refused to consider
the merger of the old parent into the new parent and the subsequent exchange
of stock as mutually interdependent events. The court viewed the merger of
the old parent into the new parent as a reorganization functionally unrelated
to and separate from the exchange of stock with the subsidiaries' minority
shareholders. Consequently, there was no shift in stock ownership between the
old and the new parent corporations, enabling the court to find an (F) re-
organization.
The (F) reorganization question was avoided by the majority of the Tax
Court in Casco Products Corp.4' Here, a corporation desired to become the
sole shareholder of Casco Corporation. Pursuant to a public tender, the
acquiring corporation succeeded in acquiring approximately ninety-one percent
of Casco's stock. To acquire the remaining nine percent of the stock, the
acquiring corporation resorted to the technique of a statutory merger, under
which the acquiring corporation formed a new corporation in the same state
of incorporation, acquired 100 percent of its issued and outstanding stock, and
then merged old Casco into the new corporation, with the nine percent minority
shareholders of old Casco being paid in cash. The taxpayer-corporation contend-
ed that a carryback of an operating loss of new Casco should be allowed against
old Casco's pre-merger income, on the ground that no reorganization took
place and that, realistically, there was a legal identity between old Casco and
new Casco, or, alternatively, on the theory that an (F) reorganization had
occurred. The Commissioner contended that an (F) reorganization could not
have taken place because there was a nine percent shift in the shareholders'
proprietary interest. The court declined to rule on the (F) reorganization
question. " Instead of facing the issue before it, the court held that what had
4847 T.C. 542 (1967).
4749 T.C. 32 (1967).48Id. at 36.
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in fact transpired was simply a redemption of the nine percent minority share-
holders, and that the merger "was merely a meaningless detour along the high-
way of redemption."'"
The majority opinion in Casco Products seems to hold the reorganization
not only functionally unrelated to the redemption, but in effect functionally
meaningless. To do so is to ignore completely the form of the parties' trans-
actions. It is submitted that the Tax Court in Casco shirked its duty in refusing
to pass on the (F) reorganization question.
(b) The Internal Revenue Service. The Internal Revenue Service has ack-
nowledged that certain transactions may be functionally unrelated to others and
may be disregarded in assessing tax consequences. The Service has found an (F)
reorganization where an old corporation reincorporated in a different state and
concurrently merged its two wholly owned subsidiaries into the new corpora-
tion." It was held that the simultaneous liquidation of the subsidiaries and
their merger into the new corporation was incidental and unrelated to the
reorganization."
In Revenue Ruling 68-349," the old corporation formed a new corporation
to which it transferred all of its assets in exchange for the new corporation's
stock. Simultaneously, an individual transferred his appreciated property to
the new corporation in exchange for the new corporation's stock. The in-
dividual attempted to treat his transfer of appreciated property as tax-free
under section 351. The Service ruled that the new corporation was organized
solely as a means for allowing the individual to transfer his appreciated assets
to the ultimate owner, the old corporation, without recognition of gain. There-
fore, the organization of the new corporation was considered merely the con-
tinuation of the old corporation, and the individual's transfer of assets to a
continuing entity of which he was not in control was not tax-free under
section 351. To reach this result, the Service had to rule that the old corpora-
tion's transfer of its assets to the new corporation was an (F) reorganization,
although there was a shift in ownership to the extent that the individual who
was not a shareholder in the old corporation received stock in the new corpora-
tion. A similar approach was employed by the Service" where an old corpora-
tion's merger into a newly-organized corporation was ruled to be an (F)
reorganization even though the new corporation's assets were then acquired
by a third corporation in exchange for its stock.
In Revenue Ruling 6 9 -4 1 3 ," the Internal Revenue Service was able to
49d.
"Rev. Rul. 58-422, 1958-2 CuM. BULL. 145.
-l The Service has also found functionally unrelated shifts in ownership with regard to
(E) reorganizations (recapitalizations). In Rev. Rul. 56-179, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 187,
where the preferred shareholders exchanged their preferred stock for cash the Service im-
pliedly acknowledged a redemption functionally unrelated to, but simultaneous with, a re-
capitalization. The same result on substantially identical facts was reached in Rev. Rul.
56-586, 1956-2 CUM. BULL. 214.
"Rev. Rul. 68-349, 1968-2 CUM. BULL. 143.
"Rev. Rul. 69-516, 1969-2 CUM. BULL. 56. See also BNA 1970 Tax Management
Memorandum No. 70-09, Tidbit No. 4, at 14 (May 4, 1970); cf. Rev. Rul. 70-140, 1970-1
CUM. BULL. 73, where a transfer of a proprietorship's assets to a controlled corporation,
followed by the acquisition of its stock by an unrelated corporation, was held not to be a
5 351 transfer.
'Rev. Rul. 69-413, 1969-2 CUM. BULL. 55.
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avoid the question of whether a proprietary shift prevented an (F) reorganiza-
tion. The old parent corporation owned ninety-nine percent of the outstanding
stock of its operating subsidiary. For adequate business reasons, the parent
corporation created a new subsidiary, which acquired substantially all of the
assets of the old subsidiary in exchange for the voting stock of the common
parent corporation. The old subsidiary distributed the stock of its parent to
its shareholders, i.e., ninety-nine percent to its parent and one percent to its
minority shareholder, and then dissolved. The transaction qualified as a (C)
(stock-for-assets) reorganization since substantially all of the assets of the
operating subsidiary were acquired by the new operating subsidiary in ex-
change for voting stock in the common parent. The question presented was
whether the new subsidiary may carry back subsequently incurred operating
losses to a taxable year of the old subsidiary ending before the date of the
reorganization. The answer to this question depended on whether the reorgani-
zation could also constitute an (F) reorganization. The Service noted that if
characterized as an (F) reorganization, section 361 (according nonrecogni-
tion of gain or loss on reorganization transfer at the corporate level) would
not be applicable to the transfer of the property from the old subsidiary to
the new subsidiary in exchange for the voting stock of the common parent
since the common parent does not qualify as "a party to the reorganization"
within the definition of section 368(b). Since section 361 of the Code was not
applicable to the transfer of property from the old subsidiary to the new
subsidiary for purposes of the (F) reorganization, the transaction was held not
to be an (F) reorganization. What the Service appears to be saying is that the
transaction could not qualify as an (F) reorganization because the transfer of
property would not then be tax-free, since the parent corporation would not
be a party to the reorganization. The ruling can be criticized in that it allows
the conceptual definition of an (F) reorganization to be controlled by the
applicability (or lack thereof) of a tax-free transfer under section 361. It
would appear that the practical merger of the operating subsidiary into a
newly organized corporate shell with no pre-existing tax attributes should
clearly have been an (F) reorganization of the classic type, since only one
operating corporation was involved, and the less-than-one-percent shift in
proprietary interest could easily be disregarded as de minimis." Neither of
these aspects of the transaction was noted by the Service."
The pinnacle of the "functionally unrelated" doctrine must be Revenue
Ruling 61-156." Here, the old corporation transferred substantially all of
its assets to a newly organized corporation in exchange for cash, notes, and
forty-five percent of the stock of the new corporation. The remaining fifty-five
percent of the stock of the new corporation was then sold to the public. Sub-
sequently, the old corporation liquidated and distributed the proceeds of the
55Rev. Rul. 66-284, 1966-2 CUM. BULL. 115.
" The Service might have distinguished the injection of one percent new shareholders
from the one percent withdrawal of existing shareholders in Rev. Rul. 66-284, 1966-2 CuM.
BULL. 115, but it did not.
In Moffatt v. Commissioner, 363 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1016
(1967), the dissenting opinion argued that the injection of 10% new shareholders pre-
cluded classification as an (F) reorganization.
51 1961-2 CUM. BULL. 62.
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sale to its shareholders. The Service ruled that the issuance of fifty-five percent
of the stock of the new corporation to the public could be disregarded as being
a separate transaction, since it was unnecessary to the dominant purpose of
the reorganization: withdrawing earnings while continuing business. There-
fore, there was no substantial proprietary shift as part of the reorganization,
and the Service was able to find both an (E) and an (F) reorganization dis-
allowing the new corporation a stepped-up basis in the assets. Moreover, the
liquidating distributions to the shareholders of the old corporation were taxed
as a dividend of a going concern under section 301 rather than as the distribu-
tion of boot under section 356, so that the dividend-within-gain limitation of
section 356 was inapplicable. 8
The ruling can be criticized in that it rationalizes the splitting of a trans-
action into two functionally unrelated events on the grounds of an improper
"dominant purpose," and thereby introduces a subjective test which may or may
not accord with the realities of the situation. Clearly, in any reorganization
there may be many purposes, business as well as personal. It could be argued
that the sale of new stock was interdependent with the reorganization, as in
Dunlap & Associates," and one could even imagine a situation where the
effectiveness of the reorganization was contractually contingent on the com-
pletion of a public offering necessary to raise funds to replace those withdrawn
in the reorganization.
The ruling seems to go further than the cases reviewed above in that it
admits that the injection of new shareholders in the new corporation can be
functionally unrelated to an (F) reorganization. Further, it represents an
extension of the (F) reorganization past that definition given the (F) re-
organization by the circuit court in Reef Corp. v. Commissioner"' in that it
does not seem to require the business carried on by the new corporation to
be substantially the same as that conducted by the old corporation. Finally,
the ruling fails to give sufficient weight to the business purposes which caused
the parties to frame their transaction in the manner which they chose. It
would seem that if there is a business purpose for shifting ownership inter-
ests, a liquidation used for the process of achieving that proprietary shift
should be given weight in determining whether an (F) or (D) reorganiza-
tion had occurred." The functionally unrelated approach, however, might be
crucial where there is no business purpose interdependent with the reorganiza-
tion. This would be the case, for example, where distributions are made inci-
dental to a reorganization which serves no discernible business purpose."
2. Functionally Unrelated Distributions. The "functionally unrelated" doc-
trine has found usage not only in disregarding the disappearance of old share-
holders or the injection of new shareholders concurrent with a reorganization,
but also in finding, and taxing, a distribution incident to a reorganization as a
going-concern dividend under section 301, rather than the distribution of
58 See text accompanying note 63 infra.
5947 T.C. 542 (1967).
60 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cit. 1966).
61 See Commissioner v. Berghash, 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1966).
62This is the essence of Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947).
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boot under section 356. This position has been asserted by the Service in
various contexts and is embodied in the regulations:
A distribution to shareholders with respect to their stock is within the
terms of section 301 although it takes place at the same time as another
transaction if the distribution is in substance a separate transaction whether
or not connected in a formal sense. This is most likely to occur in the case
of a recapitalization, a reincorporation, or a merger of a corporation with a
newly organized corporation having substantially no property.'
Under the general scheme of section 301, corporate distributions are taxed
as ordinary income to the extent of the corporation's earnings and profits, with-
out the dividend-within-gain limitation imposed on a distribution of boot
under section 356 incident to a corporate reorganization. While this regula-
tion specifically states that such going-concern distributions may occur in
connection with a recapitalization, a reincorporation, or a merger, it does not
state whether an ordinary dividend can also occur coincidentally with a liquida-
tion. Section 331, according capital gains treatment to liquidating distribu-
tions, specifically provides that "[slection 301 (relating to effects on share-
holder of distributions of property) shall not apply to any distribution of
property ... in partial or complete liquidation."" Although the language in
the statute seems clear as to the inapplicability of dividend treatment where
a complete liquidation is found, the regulations under section 331 indicate that
a going-concern dividend taxable under section 301 may be found where a
reincorporation has occurred. "' Thus, the relationship of the liquidation pro-
visions according capital gain treatment, the reorganization provisions with
their dividend-within-gain limitation, and the provisions for taxing going con-
cern distributions as dividends under section 301, pose difficult questions of
applicability. For example, in Revenue Ruling 61-15660 where an (F) re-
organization was found by disregarding the subsequent public issuance of stock
of the new corporation, the Service nonetheless held that the distributions to
the shareholders of the old corporation were to be treated as an unrelated going
concern dividend taxable under section 301, so that the dividend-within-gain
limitation of section 356 was not applicable.
(a) The Courts. The courts, however, have not been as willing to find a
functionally unrelated dividend under section 301 where a purported liquida-
tion is treated as a reincorporation. In Joseph C. Gallagher7 the court found
a true liquidation and stated that even if the liquidation were treated as a
reincorporation, ordinary income would result only if the provisions of section
356, relating to reorganizations, were applied. In opposition to the Commis-
sioner's position that regulation 1.331-1 (c) requires dividend treatment in any
case of a liquidation-reincorporation, even if a reorganization is not present,
the court felt that reincorporation distributions must be taxed, if at all, under
the reorganization sections. This raises the conceptual question of whether a
reincorporation can ever occur when it does not meet the technical require-
'
3 Treas. Reg. § 1.301-1(1) (1955).
64INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 331(b).
"See Treas. Reg. § 1.331-1(c) (1955).
61 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 62; see text accompanying note 57 supra.
6739 T.C. 144 (1962).
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ments of the reorganization sections. The Gallagher court, in dicta, answered
this question in the negative. 8 But under regulation 1.331-1(c) the distribu-
tion remains subject to ordinary income taxation as a going-concern dividend,
apart from the reorganization sections.
Related to the taxation of a dividend incident to a reorganization is the
question of how earnings and profits should be measured. Although, under
section 356, a boot dividend is limited to the amount of gain realized, it is
further limited by the shareholders' pro rata shares of the corporation's earn-
ings and profits."9
The leading case in this area is Davant v. Commissioner." Two corporations,
South Texas Rice Warehouse Company (Warehouse) and South Texas Water
Company (Water) were each owned in equal proportions by four families.
Both corporations had substantial earnings and profits. Warehouse had ap-
proximately $230,000 in cash and $700,000 in operating assets. Water had
liquid assets of at least $700,000, in addition to its operating assets. In 1960
a number of the stockholders of both corporations consulted an attorney about
the possibility of transferring the operating assets of Warehouse to Water and
consolidating the business operations. The following plan was devised: A
third party (the attorney's son) borrowed $914,000 from a bank, with which
he purchased 100 percent of the stock of Warehouse. He then caused
Warehouse to sell all of its assets to Water for $700,000 of Water's sur-
plus cash. This cash, together with $230,000 cash in Warehouse's own sur-
plus, was distributed to the third party, as sole shareholder, in complete liquida-
tion of Warehouse. Of the total of $930,000 received by him, $914,000 was
used to pay back the loan, and the remaining $15,000 remained as his profit
on the transaction.
Both the Tax Court and the Fifth Circuit ignored the role of the third party
as a straw man. The Tax Courte' held that the transaction constituted a (D)
reorganization, and that the gain was taxable as a dividend to the shareholders
of Warehouse to the extent of Warehouse's earnings and profits, which were
$230,000. The taxpayer had contended that even if the third-party straw man
were ignored, there was still a valid liquidation with capital gains treatment
under section 331.
On appeal, the circuit court saw the transactions as consisting of the fol-
lowing steps: first, $700,000 of earnings and profits of Water were distributed
through Warehouse to its shareholders; second, $230,000 in earnings and
profits of Warehouse were distributed to its shareholders; finally, the operating
assets of Warehouse were combined with Water's assets. The court viewed
68 Support for this position can also be found in Estate of John L. Bell, 30 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 1221 (1971); Simon Trust v. United States, 402 F.2d 272 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
09See, Ralph C. Wilson, Sr., 46 T.C. 334 (1966), wherein the court found a (D)
reorganization, and allowed taxation of the boot to the stockholders, in accordance with
§ 356. The court held that since a true liquidation had not occurred, the corporation's
sale of property at the corporate level was not tax-free under § 337. The amount realized
from its sale of assets could, therefore, be added to the corporation's earnings and profits
account in computing the extent of dividend taxation under § 356. See also Abegg v. Com-
missioner, 429 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1008 (1971); Pridemark,
Inc., 42 T.C. 510, aff'd, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cit. 1965).
70366 F.2d 874 (5th Cit. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967).
71 South Tex. Rice Warehouse Co., 43 T.C. 540 (1965).
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the first two steps as unnecessary and motivated by hoped-for tax minimiza-
tion. Only the last of the three steps was viewed as motivated by any business
purpose.
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the Tax Court that a (D) reorganization had
occurred, citing Commissioner v. MorganT7 as authority for the proposition
that it was unnecessary to issue additional Water stock in exchange for the
transfer of Warehouse's assets. The circuit court treated the purported sale
of assets to Water as a contribution of assets, with a concurrent distribution
of the "sales price" as a dividend to the Water shareholders. In so doing the
court brushed aside the distinction between a contribution and a sale of
assets"' and was able to avoid the conceptual difficulties in finding a (D) or
an (F) reorganization where the transferee pays fair value for the assets and
there is no constructive exchange of stock.
In addition to agreeing with the Tax Court that a (D) reorganization had
occurred, the Fifth Circuit in Davant also found that an (F) reorganization
had occurred, since the corporate enterprise continued uninterrupted, except
for the distribution of cash. There was merely a change of corporate vehicles,
not a change in substance. However, in the classic (F)-type reincorporation,
unlike Davant, an existing corporation is merged into a newly-formed corpora-
tion, and the business of the old corporation is conducted within the new
corporate shell. In Davant the old corporation's assets were transferred to a
pre-existing corporation with its own substantial business and assets. The
court answered this difference on the theory that if Water had no assets of its
own prior to the transfer of Warehouse's assets, Water would be no more
than the alter ego of Warehouse, so that an (F) reorganization would have
occurred. The fact that Water already had assets that were vertically integrated
with Warehouse's assets should not change the fact that Water was the alter
ego of Warehouse. Viewed in this manner, it should make no practical differ-
ence whether the operating assets were held by Water or Warehouse, so that
a shift between them is a mere change in identity or form, at least where there
is a complete identity of proprietary interests in both corporations. Thus, the
(F) reorganization was held to encompass the amalgamation of two com-
monly-owned operating corporations.
Turning to the distribution in liquidation of Warehouse, the court held that
the $700,000 received from Water through Warehouse by the shareholders,
together with the $230,000 received from Warehouse, were dividends taxable
72288 F.2d 676 (3d Cit. 1961).
'13 Of course, there is a distinction. For example, suppose Water had operating assets
worth $1 million and cash of $700,000 prior to the transfer, and Warehouse has operating
assets worth $700,000 and cash of $230,000 prior to the transfer. If Warehouse transfers
its assets to Water for no consideration, and then distributes its cash ($230,000) to its
shareholders in complete liquidation, it is clear that the shareholders are in exactly the same
position as if stock of Water had been issued to Warehouse and then distributed to the
shareholders. In either event, the shareholders receive $230,000 in cash and continue to own
Water stock with an increased value due to the contribution of Warehouse's assets. On the
other hand, if Water pays $700,000 in cash for Warehouse's assets, the transaction is sub-
stantially different. First, the shareholders actually receive $930,000 instead of only $230,000;
second, there would be no appreciation in the value of the Water stock nor any occasion
for the actual or constructive issuance of additional Water stock, since Water paid full value
for the assets received in the reorganization.
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under section 301, even though they were coincident to a reorganization. The
court treated the shareholders as having received two dividends, one in the
amount of $230,000 from Warehouse, and another in the amount of $700,000
from Water. Contemporaneously with the dividends was the contribution of
Warehouse's assets to Water in what the court considered to be a (D) as
well as an (F) reorganization. By treating the cash distribution as a func-
tionally unrelated dividend, the dividend-within-gain limitation of section 356
was avoided.
The taxation of the dividend under section 301 as functionally unrelated to
the reorganization may have some logical appeal where there is an identity
of shareholders in both corporations with the same proprietary interests. The
circuit court thought it illogical to say that $700,000 would be used to
measure the portion of the $930,000 distribution to be treated as a dividend
if Water were merged into Warehouse, whereas only $230,000 would be
used to measure that portion of the distribution to be treated as a dividend
were Warehouse merged into Water. Therefore, the court ruled that where
there is a complete identity of shareholders, the use of the earnings and profits
of both corporations is the only logical way to test which distributions have
the effect of a dividend."4 This is so because it is virtually impossible to tell
which corporation is in substance "the corporation" distributing the cash under
section 356(a) (2)."
It would appear that the holding that earnings and profits of both corpora-
tions could be combined in testing for a dividend under section 356 was un-
necessary under the facts in the Davant case, in view of the holding that the
total distribution represented two functionally unrelated dividend distribu-
tions that were coincident with a corporate reorganization and taxable under
section 301. However, the Service has since ruled that, where there is com-
plete shareholder identity, both corporations will be considered the distribut-
ing corporation for purposes of determining whether the distribution has the
effect of a dividend under section 356(a) (2)."'
In the context of a Davant-type reorganization, where the shareholders of
both corporations are identical and the distribution of cash is not necessary or
bargained for as part of the reorganization, the reasoning that the distribution
of cash is functionally unrelated to the reorganization is logical. In such a
situation, the distribution of cash simultaneously with the reorganization should
not be allowed to put the taxpayers in a better position, because of the section
356 limitation, than if the distribution had been made before or after the re-
organization as a normal going concern dividend. The disregarding of the
corporation chosen by the parties to survive and the combining of both cor-
porations' earnings and profits to determine dividends also has logical appeal
as a triumph of substance over form."' The thrust of Davant seems to affirm
74 But cf. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, S 304(b) (2) (A), which provides that in determin-
ing the extent of the dividend upon the redemption of stock in a brother corporation by
its sister corporation, only the sister corporation's earnings and profits are to be taken into
account.
" But see American Mfg. Co., 55 T.C. 204 (1970); Estate of John L. Bell, 30 CCH
Tax Ct. Mer. 1221 (1971).
"
0 Rev. Rul. 70-240, 1970-1 CUM. BULL. 81.
Support for this position might also be found in the fact that if the distribution had
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the trend that in the liquidation-reincorporation area the courts will break down
the reorganization to its barest elements, and may accord tax consequences to
all contemporaneous transactions separately by treating them as functionally
unrelated to the reorganization.
(b) The Internal Revenue Service. As a result of the broad language in
Davant, several approaches may now be asserted by the Commissioner in
attempting to tax liquidating distributions connected with a reincorporation as
dividends. First, the Commissioner might argue that the transaction is a cor-
porate reorganization with attendant boot taxable under section 356. If there
is identity of shareholders and if the transfer of assets is to a going corporation
with earnings and profits, the Commissioner can further argue that the earn-
ings and profits of the two corporations may be combined in testing for dividend
equivalence under section 356. Alternatively, the Commissioner could argue
that the distribution is taxable without regard to the reorganization provisions
as a functionally unrelated dividend under section 301. With respect to this
last approach, Davant appears to have overruled the dicta in Gallagher"' to
the effect that boot taxation under section 356 must govern to the exclusion
of section 301 where a reorganization is found to exist.
The Internal Revenue Service has given some insight into its current position
on the Davant-type problem in Revenue Ruling 70-240,"' where it ruled that a
classic liquidation-reincorporation involving two corporations owned by a single
shareholder was a (D) reorganization. A constructive exchange of stock was
found even though the transferee corporation purported to pay fair value for
the operating assets of the transferor. The distribution of liquid assets was held
to be taxable as boot under section 356, with the earnings and profits of both
corporations combined in determining the extent of the dividend. It is interest-
ing that the Service omitted any consideration of a functionally-unrelated
dividend taxable under section 301.80
III. THE (F) REORGANIZATION AND Loss CARRYBACKS
The Commissioner's success in Davant, holding that a practical merger of
two going concerns could be an (F) reorganization, was soon seized upon by
taxpayers as a shield from tax in situations where it was advantageous to
achieve classification as an (F), rather than a (D) reorganization. The ad-
vantage arises from the operation of section 381 of the Code.
Section 381 was introduced into the Code in 1954 in order to liberalize the
carryback and carryover provisions by making them accord with "economic
realities rather than upon such artificialities as the legal form of the reorgani-
zation."81 The section provides generally for the carryover of certain corporate
tax characteristics incident to corporate reorganizations. However, section
been postponed until the assets of the two corporations had been combined in the reorgani-
zation, and then subsequently made by the surviving corporation, the entire amount would
have been taxable as a dividend, since the earnings and profits of the constituent corpora-
tions would have been combined. See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 381 (c) (2).
78 See text accompanying note 67 supra.
71 1970-1 CUM. BULL. 81.
" Cf. Rev. Rul. 61-156, 1961-2 CuM. BULL. 62; see text accompanying note 57 supra.
'IS. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1954).
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381 (b) provides that, except in the case of an acquisition in connection with
an (F) reorganization, the taxable year of the transferor corporation ends on
the date of transfer, and the transferee corporation is not entitled to carry back
a net operating loss or a net capital loss for a taxable year ending after the
date of transfer to a taxable year of the transferor corporation.
The relationship between the (F) reorganization and the net operating loss
carryover rules had received considerable judicial attention prior to Davant.
However, since the (F) definition had been limited to the merger of a going
concern into a corporate shell, the problem of offsetting losses of one business
against the income of another did not arise.8 With Davant's holding that the
practical merger of two going concerns could constitute an (F) reorganization,
it became necessary to reconsider the carryback provisions of section 381 re-
lating to (F) reorganizations. This was done by the Ninth Circuit in two
recent cases arising in the Tax Court.
The first case was Estate of Bernard H. Staufler.8" A sole shareholder, Bernard
H. Stauffer, owned three corporations, referred to as Stauffer of California,
Stauffer of Illinois and Stauffer of New York, the businesses of which were
substantially integrated. In order to reduce manufacturing and overhead costs,
Stauffer decided to relocate all of the business in Albuquerque, New Mexico.
Accordingly, he formed Stauffer of New Mexico in August 1959. Stauffer of
New Mexico had the same officers and directors as the other three Stauffer
companies, and Stauffer continued to be its sole stockholder. A plan of reor-
ganization was formulated whereby the three old Stauffer companies would
merge into Stauffer of New Mexico on October 1, 1959, in accordance with
the statutory merger laws of the respective states.
The merger was consummated, but because of reversals in business, the
contemplated relocation to Albuquerque was never carried out. Instead, Stauffer
of New Mexico operated out of the Los Angeles office of the old Stauffer of
California. It continued to carry on the operations previously conducted by the
old Stauffer companies from the same location and in the same manner as
before the merger. The accounting records continued to be kept as though the
three old Stauffer companies were in existence, except that no intercompany
profits appeared on the books. For its first taxable year, Stauffer of New Mexico
showed a net loss of almost $800,000, which it offset against the combined
pre-merger incomes of the three old Stauffer corporations. For its next taxable
year, Stauffer of New Mexico showed a net operating loss of roughly $3.3
million, which it attempted to carry back by applying the loss of Stauffer of
82 See Newmarket Mfg. Co. v. United States, 233 F.2d 493 (1st Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 983 (1957). Where taxpayers did attempt to offset losses of one going concern
against the income of another going concern (both parties to the reorganization), prior to
the advent of the specific prohibition of S 381 (b) the courts refused to allow the carryover
on the grounds that the losses and income were not incurred by the same "taxpayer." The
leading case is Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382 (1957). With the advent of S
381(b), courts would allow carrybacks of post-merger losses against pre-merger income
only where the successor corporation was a newly organized corporate shell with no pre.
existing tax attributes, and as a practical matter functioned as the alter ego of the old cor-
poration. See, e.g., Holliman v. United States, 275 F. Supp. 927 (S.D. Ala. 1967); Dunlap
& Associates, Inc., 47 T.C. 542 (1967). For a recent ruling, see Rev. Rul. 70-241, 1970-1
CUM. BULL. 84.8348 T.C. 277 (1967).
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New Mexico against the pre-merger income of Stauffer of California. Thus,
the Tax Court was faced squarely with the question of whether a net operating
loss of Stauffer of New Mexico for a post-merger fiscal year could be carried
back and offset against the income of Stauffer of California for its pre-merger
fiscal years.
The Tax Court held that the merger was not an (F) reorganization, agree-
ing with the Government's position that an (F) reorganization is limited to
the reorganization of a single corporation and does not include the more in-
volved combination of two or more corporations where each has been con-
ducting a separate business. The court felt that the merger of three going
corporations into a single new corporate entity involved changes that were far
too significant to be dismissed as mere changes in identity, form, or place of
organization. The Tax Court stated that it would not accept the Fifth Cir-
cuit's interpretation of the (F) definition in Davant. Moreover, the Tax Court
distinguished Revenue Ruling 58-422," which had held that the merger of a
parent corporation together with its two subsidiaries into a newly organized
parent corporation constituted an (F) reorganization for purposes of section
381. It was distinguished on the ground that in that ruling the subsidiaries and
their business were always under the same corporate umbrella of the parent,
both before and after the parent's reincorporation. In Stauffer, however, it was
impossible to single out the reincorporation of a parent corporation, since what
was involved was the merger of three active brother-sister corporations.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed." The circuit court placed considerable
emphasis on Revenue Ruling 58-422 as well as on the holding in Davant that
where there is a complete identity of shareholders, a merger of pre-existing
corporations may be an (F) reorganization. In the court's words:
The principle we derive from Davant is that a shift in operating assets from
the transferor corporation to its alter ego wherein the identity of the pro-
prietary interest remains intact and the business enterprise of the transferor
corporation continues unimpaired results in an 'F' reorganization. There is a
change of corporate vehicles but not a change in the substance of the trans-
feror corporation. "
Taking a pragmatic approach, the Ninth Circuit noted that had Stauffer of
Illinois and Stauffer of New York merged into Stauffer of California, the
latter could have carried back a post-merger loss to one of its own pre-merger
taxable years. In the alternative, had Stauffer of California reincorporated
into Stauffer of New Mexico, and thereafter consummated mergers with Stauffer
of New York and Stauffer of Illinois, a post-merger loss sustained by Stauffer
of New Mexico could have been carried back to a pre-merger taxable year of
Stauffer of California."
The Commissioner countered that anomalous tax results would follow were
the transaction treated as an (F) reorganization. For example, section
381(b) (3) would permit Stauffer of New Mexico to carry back its post-
41958-2 CuM. BULL. 145. See also Rev. Rul. 57-276, 1957-1 CUM. BULL. 126.
5403 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1968).
"6Id. at 619.
"'See Treas. Reg. S 1.381(c) (1)-1(b) (1960).
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merger loss to a pre-merger taxable year of the transferor corporations. On
the other hand, section 381(c) (1) (A) provides no exception for the (F)
reorganization from the general rule that the taxable year of the acquiring
corporation to which the net operating loss carryovers of the transferor cor-
poration are first carried, is the first taxable year ending after the date of trans-
fer." This would prevent a carryback of a net operating loss of the transferor
corporations to a pre-merger year of Stauffer of New Mexico. Thus, the Com-
missioner argued that if Congress had intended the (F) reorganization defini-
tion to encompass more than a single enterprise, it logically would have pro-
vided the same exception for the (F) reorganization in section 381 (c) (1) (A)
as it provided in section 381 (b) (3). The court dismissed this argument, not-
ing that Stauffer of New Mexico had no pre-merger taxable year to which
any loss of the transferor corporations could have been carried back, and this
fact alone strongly indicated that Stauffer of New Mexico was nothing more
than the alter ego of the three constituent corporations. Furthermore, the court
rejected the Commissioner's negative inversion of section 381(c) (1) (A):
Reading §381 (c) (1) (A) as written, it provides that the pre-merger net
operating loss of the transferor corporation may be carried forward to a
post-merger year of the transferee corporation. Together with §381 (b)
(whereby the transferee corporation may carry back a post-merger loss to a
pre-merger taxable year of a transferor corporation) it provides the trans-
feree in an 'F' reorganization with a most favorable treatment of losses. With
tax advantages such as these available to the 'F' reorganization, we fail to see
an anomaly in the denial of the carryback of the transferor's pre-merger net
operating loss to a pre-merger taxable year of the transferee."
The court also reasoned that since section 381(c) (1) (A) must apply to all
corporate reorganizations, if the (F) reorganization were limited to the rein-
corporation of a single corporation, Congress would have excepted the (F)
reorganization from the multi-corporation provisions in section 381 (c)( 1)-
(A).
The Commissioner also posited the case where the three transferor corpora-
tions, prior to the merger, were not on the same taxable year. The Ninth Circuit
expressly refused to decide whether different accounting methods of the trans-
feror corporations would disrupt the requisite continuity for an (F) reorgani-
zation, but noted that section 381 (c) (4) delegates to the Treasury authority
to prescribe the methods of accounting to be used in such a case.9"
Having concluded that the merger was an (F) reorganization, the court
turned its attention to the extent to which the loss carryback should be allowed.
,8 "The taxable year of the acquiring corporation to which the net operating loss carry-
overs of the distributor or transferor corporation are first carried shall be the first taxable
year ending after the date of the distribution or transfer." INT. REV. CODE of 1954, S
381(c) (1) (A).
"' 403 F.2d at 620 (emphasis in original).
90 The acquiring corporation shall use the method of accounting used by the
distributor or transferor corporation on the date of distribution or transfer
unless different methods were used by several distributor or transferor cor-
porations or by a distributor or transferor corporation and the acquiring cor-
poration. If different methods were used, the acquiring corporation shall use
the method or combination of methods of computing taxable income adopted
pursuant to regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate.
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, S 381(c)( 4 ).
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As discussed above, the court noted that had the merger been effected in a
number of other ways, the post-merger loss of Stauffer of New Mexico could
have been carried back to and applied against the pre-merger income of Stauf-
fer of California to the extent that it represented the loss of Stauffer of Cali-
fornia, but for the simultaneous merger of the three corporations. The court
adopted this "but for" approach,"' and held that the portion of the losses of
Stauffer of New Mexico attributable to the operations of Stauffer of California
could be carried back to a pre-merger taxable year of Stauffer of California, but
that the losses representing the business operations of Stauffer of Illinois and
Stauffer of New York could not be carried back to or offset pre-merger in-
come of Stauffer of California. Thus, the court allowed the carryback only with
respect to the principal predecessor corporation, and therefore, as far as the loss
carryback aspects are concerned, found in effect an (F) reorganization with the
simultaneous merger of the two smaller corporations. This holding was similar
to Revenue Ruling 58-422, except that in Stauffer the two smaller corpora-
tions were brother-sister corporations of the principal predecessor corporation
rather than subsidiaries of it.
The day after its decision in Staufler, the Tax Court filed its decision in As-
sociated Machine." Here, the old corporation, Machine Shop, was wholly
owned by one individual and was engaged in the operation of a general ma-
chine shop business. Its sole shareholder also owned another corporation, J & M
Engineering, which conducted a sheet metal fabricating business. The separate
existence of each corporate entity had been respected by keeping separate book-
keeping and accounting records and by purchasing supplies and services, and
paying expenses, separately. Each corporation held separate shareholders' and
directors' meetings, had its own employees, and contracted with its own
customers.
On November 30, 1960, Machine Shop was statutorily merged into J & M
Engineering, and, upon the merger, the surviving corporation changed its name
to Associated Machine. After the merger, Associated Machine continued to
operate both the general machine shop business and the sheet metal fabrication
business. The precise question presented to the Tax Court was whether a net
operating loss of Associated Machine for its fiscal year ended November 30,
1962, could be carried back and applied against pre-merger income of Machine
Shop for its calendar year 1959. This in turn involved the question of whether
the merger of Machine Shop into J & M Engineering was an (F) reorganiza-
tion, so that the carryback would be permitted under section 381(b). The
Commissioner contended that the statutory merger of two active brother-sister
corporations could not be an (F) reorganization. The Tax Court agreed, find-
ing that the transaction was not a mere change of identity, form, or place
of organization.
On the same day as its reversal of Staufler, the Ninth Circuit reversed the
Tax Court's decision in Associated Machine v. Commissioner.3 The circuit
"'See Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382 (1957); Newmarket Mfg. Co. v.
United States, 233 F.2d 493 (1st Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 983 (1957); note 82
supra.
9"48 T.C. 318 (1967).
'3403 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1968).
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court held that the Commissioner's position, that the transferee in an (F) re-
organization must be a corporate shell with no pre-existing business or tax
attributes, was too narrow, and that no logical distinction exists between a
shell transferee and an active transferee when two factors co-exist: (1) the
proprietary interest in the transferor and transferee corporations is identical,
and (2) the business continuity is not interrupted.
As in Stauffer, the Commissioner contended that anomalous tax results would
flow from the Ninth Circuit's decision. The Commissioner first questioned the
result if the successor corporation were on a different tax year than the trans-
feror corporation. The court brushed this aside by stating that the Commissioner
failed to explain why the shell transferee corporation in a classic (F) reorgani-
zation could not be formed with an accounting year different from that of the
transferor corporation which must present the Commissioner with the same
dilemma."
The Commissioner also raised the anomaly, as in Stauffer, that if this were
an (F) reorganization, section 381(b) would allow a carryback of a post-
merger loss of the transferee corporation to a pre-merger year of the transferor
corporation, but section 381(c) (1) (A) would prevent a carryover of a pre-
merger loss of the transferor corporation to a pre-merger year of the transferee
corporation. The court countered by stating that section 381(b) and section
381 (c)( 1 ) (A) are mirror images, allowing a post-merger loss to be carried
from the transferee corporation to the transferor, and a pre-merger loss to be
carried from the transferor to the transferee corporation. The court stated
further that section 381(c) (1) (A) only prohibits offsetting the transferor's
pre-merger loss with the transferee's pre-merger income, and that this is not a
carryback but a horizontal transfer since the income and loss involved occurred
simultaneously and not in sequence. After explaining away the alleged ano-
malies, the court held that the successor corporation (Associated Machine)
could carry back a post-merger loss to offset the pre-merger profits of the trans-
feror corporation, without regard to the fact that the post-merger losses may
not have been sustained in the conduct of the transferor corporation's business.
In Revenue Ruling 69-185"s the Service announced that it would not follow
the decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the Stauffer and
Associated Machine cases, nor that portion of the decision of the Fifth Circuit
in Davant dealing with the question of whether the combination of two or
more commonly owned operating corporations may qualify as an (F) reorgani-
91 Query whether the successor corporation in an (F) reorganization may indeed adopt
a different tax year. The question was not reached in either Stauffer or Associated Machine.
Under § 381(b) (1), the transferor's tax year does not end upon an (F) reorganization,
and the regulations under § 381 seem to infer that for all purposes the tax year and tax
accounting methods of the transferor corporation continue uninterrupted. See Treas. Reg.
§1.381(b)-1 (a) (2) (1960). The answer may be that under S 422, a change in tax years
is allowable, upon approval of the Service. Under the court's conceptual approach to the
(F) definition, this becomes a minor technicality which does not go to the issue of whether
certain operative facts in the transaction constitute an (F) reorganization. However, under
the Commissioner's more pragmatic approach to the (F) definition, the change in account-
ing years would raise the further anomaly that the (F) reorganization status would depend
on the Secretary's approval of a change in accounting methods where the transferee was
on a different tax year than the transferor. But see INT. REv. CODE of 1954, S 381 (c) (4),
quoted in note 90 supra.
95 1969-1 CuM. BULL. 108.
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zation. Echoing the Commissioner in the Ninth Circuit cases, the Service stated
that if an (F) reorganization could encompass the amalgamation of multiple
business entities, it is anomalous for Congress to have provided an exception
in section 381(b) to the requirement of filing final returns and to have per-
mitted the carryback of net operating losses without granting similar treatment
to all amalgamating transactions encompassed by section 381. Similarly, the
absence of an exception for the (F) reorganization in section 381 (c) (1) (A)
is anomalous unless the (F) reorganization is limited to the reorganization of
a single business enterprise," in which case the transferee merely continues
the tax year and tax attributes of the transferor.
The Ninth Circuit in Associated Machine is in accord with the Fifth Circuit
in Davant, in holding that an (F) reorganization can involve the amalgama-
tion of more than one active corporation where there is identity in the pro-
prietary interest of the transferor and transferee corporations, and where the
business continuity is not interrupted. But the court in Associated Machine
went beyond Staufler, and decided an issue not raised in Davant, when it al-
lowed post-merger losses of the "sister" corporation to be carried back to and
offset by pre-merger income of the "brother" corporation. This obviated the
necessity for tracing the source of the income and loss which formed the basis
of the "physically-integrated assets" test in Stauffer.. Thus, Associated Machine
was the logical extension of Davant, while Stauffer adopted the more tradi-
tional "but for" approach in allowing loss carrybacks in (F) reorganizations.
Davant, Stauffer, and Associated Machine are logically appealing in that,
for tax purposes, it should be immaterial whether a business enterprise is car-
ried on in several corporations or is combined under a single corporate roof
with several divisions." The question becomes whether the rationale enunciated
in Libson Shops," that the income and losses must be produced by substantially
the same business, has retained vitality in delineating the limits to which oper-
ating losses may be carried back under section 381. The Associated Machine
court apparently answered this question in the negative.
The rule set out in Stauffer was followed in Home Construction Corp. of
America v. United States." In this case 123 brother-sister corporations owned
by one individual were merged into a newly organized shell corporation owned
by the same individual. All of the old corporations were actively engaged in
various aspects of the home building field and their operations were econom-
ically, if not physically, integrated. The situation differed from that in Staufger,
however, in that the constituent corporations operated on diverse fiscal years
for reporting federal income taxes. Upon the merger, the constituent corpora-
tions closed their respective tax years and adopted a common fiscal year coin-
ciding with that of the successor corporation. The district court'" held that
"See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.381(b)-1(a) (1) and (2) (1960); cf. id. § 1.381(c) (1)-1(b).
" This logical reasoning becomes even more appealing in view of the gradual withdrawal
of the multiple surtax exemptions after 1969. See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 1561, 1564.
9 353 U.S. 382 (1957); see note 82 supra. In Maxwell Hardware Co. v. Commissioner,
343 F.2d 713 (9th Cir. 1965), the Ninth Circuit has held that Libson Shops has been
superseded by sections 381 and 382, but the Service has stated that it will not follow the
case. Treas. Inf. Rel. 773, Oct. 13, 1965.
"9439 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1971).
'"311 F. Supp. 830 (S.D. Ala. 1970).
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the merger constituted an (F) reorganization, so that post-merger losses of
the successor corporation could be applied against pre-merger income of its
constituent corporations. The court deviated from Stauffer, however, in allow-
ing such application without regard to the business source of the income and
losses.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the
multiple corporation merger constituted an (F)-type reorganization. The
circuit court relied on both Davant and Stauffer in reaching this result, finding
that both cases hold that an (F) reorganization occurs where there is an
identity of proprietary interests in the transferor and transferee corporations
and an uninterrupted continuity of business enterprise in a new form which is
merely the alter ego of the old form. The court emphasized that, in substance,
there is no difference between the pre-merger operation consisting of 123
closely affiliated corporations and the post-merger operation consisting of the
conduct of the same business with the same assets and ownership through
numerous divisions of a single corporation.
Unlike the district court, however, the circuit court in Home Construction
imposed a limit on the allowable loss carryback. The court stated that the cor-
rect calculation of loss carrybacks could not allow an after-merger taxpayer
to obtain any more favorable tax treatment than it would have received had
the loss occurred under the pre-merger form of the business.'' In applying this
rationale, the Fifth Circuit allowed the net operating loss carryback only to
the extent that the losses of the transferee corporation could be "reunitized"
for the sake of tax accountability into the same taxable units which existed
before the mergers. In this manner, only such portion of the overall loss as
could be shown to be attributable to each respective separate division within
the transferee could be carried back, and then only to offset against the income
of such division's pre-merger counterpart. In effect, the Fifth Circuit limits
the net operating loss carryback in the same manner as the Ninth Circuit in
Stauffer.
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE (F) REORGANIZATION
In the liquidation-reincorporation area, it seems clear that the Internal
Revenue Service will no longer press the (F) reorganization issue because of
the adverse results under section 381, except where a single active business is
reincorporated in a new corporate shell. For this reason, the Commissioner
can be expected to revert to the (D) reorganization as the primary tool in
combatting reincorporations."' The Commissioner might also attempt to deny
capital gains treatment on the theory that no true liquidation has occurred to
bring section 331 into effect, apart from the question of whether the trans-
action can be fitted into a reorganization definition."3 Moreover, the "func-
tionally unrelated" approach seems bound to continue to play an important
role in the reincorporation area.
""'The court here relied on Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382 (1957).
""2See Rev. Rul. 70-240, 1970-1 CuM. BULL. 81.




The problem, of course, is in defining the outer limits of the "functionally
unrelated" doctrine when applied to a specific transaction. While its applica-
tion in abuse cases might produce equitable results, shall the disappearance of
shareholders of the transferor corporation always be viewed as functionally
unrelated to the reorganization when it can be accomplished by redemption
without the need of a reorganization? Shall the injection of new shareholders
always be viewed as functionally unrelated when it could have been accom-
plished by the issuance of additional stock without the need to change cor-
porate vehicles? If so, one can conceive of extreme examples of shifts in pro-
prietary interest contemporaneous with (F) reorganizations. If carried this
far, the "functionally unrelated" doctrine could completely strip the reorganiza-
tion provisions of their meticulously detailed statutory continuity of interest
requirements and defeat the rationale of the reorganization sections to post-
pone recognition of gain or loss only on insufficiently closed transactions.'
Even in the interest of protecting the revenues by combatting reincorporations,
the "functionally unrelated" doctrine should not operate to ignore substantial
proprietary shifts. Some shareholder continuity should be a prerequisite to
finding a reincorporation, and the statutory continuity of interest requirements
at least provide a line of demarcation between corporate restructuring and
corporate liquidation or sale. The eighty percent continuity of interest require-
ment of the (D) reorganization and the requirement of shareholder identity
in the (F) reorganization should be determined after taking into account all
proprietary shifts occurring as part of the plan of reorganization, regardless of
whether the proprietary shift is mutually interdependent with the other steps
also part of the plan of reorganization."°' While such a test would impose the
task of determining what steps were part of the plan of reorganization, and
thus might raise the same objection of uncertainty as does the functionally
unrelated approach, it would permit all steps in the plan of reorganization to
be viewed together in testing against the reorganization definition, regardless
of whether some of those steps could have been accomplished without the
others. The only alternative would seem to be a completely mechanical statute
which views all shifts of proprietary interest within, for example, one year
before and after the reorganization as a part of the reorganization.
One can find somewhat more sympathy for the "functionally unrelated"
doctrine when applied to avoid the limitation of section 356 and to tax the
reincorporation distribution as a going-concern dividend, as in Davant. The
"functionally unrelated" dividend appears to be grounded in the Supreme
Court's decision in Bazley v. Commissioner,'" and thus has long been part of
the judicial gloss in the reorganization area. Nevertheless, it does require a
determination, by the courts, by tax planners, and by the Service, as to when a
distribution incident to a reincorporation can be viewed as functionally un-
related, and, therefore, should be taxed as a going-concern dividend. Davant
presented an easy solution on easy facts, but where there is no complete share-
'
04 See Treas. Reg. S 1.368-1(b) (1955).
"' See Pugh, The F Reorganization: Reveille for a Sleeping Giant?, 24 TAx. L. REV.
437, 448 (1969).
101331 U.S. 737 (1947).
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holder identity, it would be more difficult to characterize a distribution as
functionally unrelated since it might be a necessary, or bargained-for, element
of the reorganization.
In the loss carryback setting, the Stauffer and Home Construction result may
not be wholly repugnant to the extent that it permits post-reorganization
losses of the successor corporation's business to be carried back and applied
against income from that corporation's own pre-reorganization business, since
a similar carryback is allowed to the transferee operating corporation in an
(A) or (C) reorganization." ' However, the broader approach of Associated
Machine departs from this rationale by permitting the carryback without regard
to the corporate entity which earned the income thus offset. This appears to
disregard the rationale underlying section 381(b) that loss carrybacks are
allowed only within the framework of a single operating corporation. The
Associated Machine result is appealing from an economic point of view, but
the question of whether the losses and income of a business enterprise may be
offset regardless of whether that business enterprise is conducted under one or
many corporate roofs would seem to be a question of tax policy to be an-
swered by Congress rather than the courts.
The Ninth and Fifth Circuit's concept of the (F) definition as including
the amalgamation of two or more operating corporations where the twin fac-
tors of shareholder identity and uninterrupted business continuity are present,
also raises a host of problems of application under the present structure of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954. If such an amalgamation is an (F) reor-
ganization, how does one account for the express provision in section 381(b)
that the transferor corporation's tax year does not close upon the date of the
reorganization? The Ninth Circuit held that this is merely a question of ac-
counting practice and does not go to the definitional concept of the (F) reor-
ganization. But if the taxable years of the constituent corporations do not end
by reason of the (F) reorganization, it would seem to follow that pre-merger
income and losses of these corporations would be reported on the transferee
corporation's tax return for its first tax year following the reorganization, thus
permitting the constituent corporations to offset each other's income and losses
from operations in the pre-merger period."8 The Ninth Circuit agreed this
result was anomalous in Associated Machine, although it failed to deal with
the problem adequately. Similarly, the use of the singular tense in the last
sentence of section 1244(d) (2), stating that "a successor corporation in a
reorganization described in section 368(a) (1) (F) shall be treated as the
same corporation as its predecessor," indicates that the 1954 Code and the
regulations thereunder... are structured on the premise that an (F) reorgani-
zation can involve but one operating company.
In view of these technical discrepancies, as well as the legislative history of
the (F) definition,"' one is forced to conclude that the extension of the (F)
" See Treas. Reg. S 1.381(c) (1)-1(b) (1960).
"' The technical problems resulting from the Ninth Circuit holdings are discussed in
Pugh, supra note 105, at 462.
"°'See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-75(d) (2) (i) (1966).
"'See text accompanying note 5 supra.
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definition to cover reorganizations involving more than one operating cor-
poration is unwarranted under the present structure of the Code. However,
the Ninth Circuit's economic approach to loss carrybacks should cause some
reconsideration of the present rules under section 381. There is much merit in
allowing losses to offset income from the same business enterprise owned by
the same shareholders, regardless of the type, or number, of corporate forms in
which that business is conducted. In addition to the possibility of this expanded
consolidated return concept, the situation could be relieved by the redrafting
of section 381 to follow economic lines, rather than having the tax result
dictated by the type of reorganization found for purposes of part III of sub-
chapter C.
What is most needed, however, is an end to the uncertainties raised by the
expansion of the (F) definition. If other courts follow the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits and the Commissioner refuses to concede, taxpayers can be expected
to continue to litigate the (F) reorganization issue. In the interests of making
tax practice a more exact science, and, more importantly, to preclude the (F)
definition from assuming an all-encompassing role in the reorganization area
as well as permitting loss carrybacks probably unintended by Congress, it is
submitted the answer must lie with a Supreme Court decision, or congressional
amendment, limiting the (F) definition to a reorganization involving a single
operating corporation.
[Vol. 27
